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Abstract
Two different definitions of the Artificial Intelligence concept have
been proposed in papers [1] and [2]. The first definition is informal.
It says that any program that is cleverer than a human being, is
acknowledged as Artificial Intelligence. The second definition is formal
because it avoids reference to the concept of ‘human being’. The
readers of papers [1] and [2] might be left with the impression that both
definitions are equivalent and the definition in [2] is simply a formal
version of that in [1]. This paper will compare both definitions of
Artificial Intelligence and, hopefully, will bring a better understanding
of the concept.
What is the basic idea?
The idea behind the definitions of Artificial Intelligence in [1, 2] is as follows.
If a program is intelligent it should manage well in an arbitrary world. This
is a version of the popular wisdom that a clever person can handle any job.
Certainly, the clever person will not be immediately successful in doing a
novel job but after some training (learning).
Therefore, before we evaluate how well a program does in a particular
world, we should first allow for a certain time for training to pass. Only
when the training is over, we could assess how well the program is doing.
∗This work was supported by Bulgarian Ministry of Education, project DID02-28.
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We can make a comparison with humans. The first eighteen years of hu-
man life are considered as a period of training. If we do something wrong
or even commit a crime, the punishment will be milder, because it is be-
lieved that we are still learning. The training period with animals is usually
shorter; this is commonly associated with their shorter lives and worse living
conditions. The rule that is often true about animals is ‘Learn fast or be
eaten!’
How long is the training period for AI program and is it possible to say
when exactly it is over?
Here comes the first difference between the definitions in [1] and [2]. The
first definition assumes that the program’s lifespan is infinite and therefore
there is plenty of time for training. This is to say, if the training period
has an arbitrary finite length, it is still infinitely shorter compared to the
program’s whole life, if the latter is infinite.
The approach in the second definition is different. It assumes that the
program’s lifespan is bounded and there is a parameter ‘maximum lifespan’.
The program’s success is evaluated on the basis of this finite lifespan. Another
difference is with regards to the training period. It is not included in the
second definition.The rule which is enforced is ‘Learn fast or be eaten’.
The question arises, why the period of training is zero with the second
definition.We set it to zero because we cannot say how long should this period
be and when it will be completed. It is convenient to assume that there is
no such period.
Reminding
Let’t to remind how were formulated the definitions of AI in [1] and [2].
Definition 1: AI will be such a program which in an arbitrary world will
manage not worse than a human.
Here the worlds are not absolutly arbitrary because we suppose that fatal
errors are not possible in these worlds.
Definition 2: AI will be such a program which IQ is bigger than 0.7.
Here the IQ is the averige succes acived by the program in some set of
test worlds.
Nota bene: When we call the Artificial Intelligence device a ‘program’
we are not absolutely precise. A program is a piece of text, written on paper
or another carrier. To start ‘living’, the program must be run on a computer.
There is a second inaccuracy, as well: while in Theory of Programs a program
is usually associated with a computable function, here by program we will
understand a transducer. A computable function takes as input some data
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and after some processing time returns output (if its program does not halt),
while a transducer takes some information in and spits some out at every
step. In [1] we stipulated that Artificial Intelligence is a step device. When
we say here ‘the program’ we mean this step device as a computer executing
a program. In this paper we use the terms ‘program’, ‘device’ and ‘robot’
synonymously when we speak about AI. However, for every step of the step
device its program makes many small steps which correspond to the computer
tacts.
By ‘program’s life’ we mean all the steps a device has produced from the
moment of switch on until we switch it off, or until infinity. Therefore, the
program’s life is a finite or infinite row of inputs and outputs for the device.
Abstract human being
When in definition [1] we compare the intelligence of the program with the
intelligence of a human being, we make the assumption that this is an abstract
human being. A real human being could be sick, tired or bored, and that’s
why we will imagine an abstract human being who is always in good shape.
What would happen if we compare the program with a real instead with
an abstract human being? In such case, almost all programs would satisfy
the definition, since even the most stupid program would do no worse than
a human being. This is because all humans are mortal, while the program
is immortal. At the beginning of his life the human will do better than the
stupid program but this will continue as long as the human is still alive. From
then on until infinity the program will do no worse than the dead human.
If we calculate the average success of the human being and of the stupid
program, they will turn out to be equal. That’s so because, as we’ve already
mentioned, any finite beginning of life is infinitely smaller than the entire
lifespan.
Which program would we define as stupid? The most stupid program
possible is the one who has an IQ of 1/2. (The definition of IQ is given
below.) Programs with an IQ lower than 1/2 are not stupid, rather they
are acting stupid or are following a losing strategy on purpose. Examples of
programs with IQ of 1/2 are the arbitrary and the dead program. We call an
arbitrary program one that makes moves randomly irregardless of its input,
while a dead program is one that on every step performs one constant move
irregardless of input.
If we want the human under comparison to be a real human being and
not an abstract one, then we will have to assume that the program’s lifespan
is finite instead of infinite. To have enough time for training, we must assume
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that life is long enough but not that long for the human being to get tired,
bored or to die.
Are the two definitions equivalent?
Let’s take a program that needs nearly infinite time for training (that is, its
period of training is finite but in practice it is infinite). We would call that
a retarded program. Examples for such programs are TD1 and TD2 in [2].
From the previous sections it follows that the definitions for AI in [1] and
[2] are not equivalent because a retarded program is Artificial Intelligence
according to the definition in [1], while it is not according to the definition
in [2].
The retarded program does not match our idea of Artificial Intelligence.
If our intention is to construct a robot to sweep the floor, it would not work
for us if the robot needs a thousand years to learn how to sweep.
Let’s check if there are other programs that formally satisfy the definition
but do not match the idea of Artificial Intelligence. Such a program is the
infinitely inefficient program, even tough it satisfies both definitions. Paper
[2] describes such a program as Trivial Decision 5. This program would work
if we had an infinitely fast computer, because in order to calculate a single
big step it makes nearly infinite number of small steps (i.e. finite many but
in practice infinite). Here, we call big steps the tacts of the step device and
small steps are the computer tacts.
The problem is that by the definition of Artificial Intelligence we define
a program without stipulating any requirements regarding its efficiency.
Both definitions for AI define a set of programs. These sets should coin-
cide if the definitions were equivalent. The example of the retarded program
shows that the definitions are not equivalent.
There are two more reasons why both definitions are not equivalent:
Firstly, the definition in [1] is informal and dependent on people. That is
to say, it does not define a particular set but rather a sort of fuzzy one. We
said that we acknowledge as Artificial Intelligence those programs that are
cleverer than humans. The reasonable question to ask with that statement is:
‘Who is the man we compare with?’ A possible answer is that the program
is cleverer than any human being, however, this would not define the set
of these programs in a unique manner. For example, if we define the chess-
playing program as a program playing chess better than the current top world
champion, there will be still programs that will play chess better than top
champion at one particular time and worse - at another. Therefore, a formal
and an informal definition cannot be equivalent.
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Secondly, the definition in [2] is dependent on several parameters. This
is to say, that it is not the case of a set of programs but rather a function
that for different parameter values returns different sets of programs.
The assumption made in [2] is that there exist parameter values for which
the set defined by the definition is not empty and the programs within that
set match our idea of Artificial Intelligence.
Certainly, not all programs within that set match our idea, however. We
have already mentioned the problem with the infinitely inefficient program.
Another problem that appears with the definition in [2] is the ‘cramming’
program. The problem is that in [2] it is assumed that the worlds we are
interested in are finite in number. Therefore, a program can be created
specially for these worlds. We can illustrate this problem with students
taking their exams – those who have memorised by heart all possible exam
topics will pass the exam but they won’t be able to solve any problem outside
of that range.
The assumption is that if we select the shortest and the most efficient
program out of those that satisfy the definition, it will match our idea of
Artificial Intelligence. It is necessary to limit the programs in both length and
efficiency because the infinitely inefficient program is rather short, whereas
the ‘cramming’ programs are rather efficient. The ‘cramming’ program is
shorter than the Artificial Intelligence one for a small number of worlds,
while the Artificial Intelligence program is a shorter than the ‘cramming’
one, if the number of worlds is sufficiently great.
Lifespan
The program’s lifespan is the primary parameter, on which the second defi-
nition depends. Once we give up infinite life, then we should limit it and set
a parameter indicating the life expectancy. To make it simple, the program’s
lifespan in [2] has been fixed to 100 games, each one no longer than 1000
steps.
Giving up infinite life, we let go of the retarded program. Another ad-
vantage is that it is no longer required that the worlds do not allow fatal
errors. This requirement was important in [1] because in order to ensure
there is sufficient time for training in a program’s life, we had to exclude the
possibility of making a fatal error that would ruin the program’s possibility
for success for its entire lifetime. In that case the program could safely make
mistakes as each one wouldn’t be fatal and could be overcome.
Definition: Fatal error is a group of internal states of the world, such
that when we enter this group we can no longer exit it. If there is an exit, the
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error would not be fatal. Besides, the world in this group should be worse
than the world outside of the group (i.e. the rewards received there should
be relatively lower). If the world in the group is not worse, then the fact that
we happen to be there would not be a mistake.
Another possible definition for fatal error is the following. If at each
moment of life we calculate the maximum anticipated success for that life
trajectory (i.e. the result of the Success function), provided that from that
moment onwards we play (we live) by the best possible strategy, then fatal
error will be referred to as a step after which this number is decreasing.
Having assumed that life is finite, it is not needed to assume that there
are no fatal errors in the world, because our time for training is anyway
limited. When life is finite, a common mistake can be equal to fatal, because
time may not be sufficient to fix it.
Thus, it is natural to assume that life is finite and we are looking for a
program that can manage well within concrete lifespan rather than looking
for a program suitable for arbitrary lifespan. On the other hand, it is incon-
venient if there are parameters included in our definition. It would be better
to define Artificial Intelligence as a program independent of anything. That
is to say, a sole program, irrespective of the anticipated lifespan.
However, life expectancy is an important parameter that influences ac-
tor’s strategies. Let’s consider human behavior in war time, during natural
disasters or other catastrophes. When life expectancy becomes shorter, hu-
man behavior changes significantly. This is expressed mainly in the tendency
to take greater risks. You may also notice that young people are braver than
older ones. A possible explanation of this observation is that the young are
more willing to experiment and take risks while the adults prefer stability
and security because they estimate that there is not so much time anymore
for experimenting. Thus, we can say that life expectancy definitely influences
behavior of people and their life strategies.
Arbitrary world
The first definition requires for the Artificial Intelligence to manage as good
as a human being in an arbitrary world. This requirement is so strong that
it seems that there is no program that can meet the requirement. The set of
programs that satisfy the definition may prove to be empty.
Let’s try to construct a world which is too complex for any program to
succeed in it but not for the human. Imagine a world where robots are not
liked. In such world, if you are recognized as a robot you immediately score
low. However, if you are considered human you score high. It seems that this
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is the world where humans will do better than robots. Let’s remember the
definition for a world; there are two functions (World and View) defining the
world. They are absolutely arbitrary functions and we can presume that they
return success when there is a human being living in this world, respectively,
they return no success in the case of a robot. Still, the world is not God and
there is no way to know if its inhabitant is human or robot. The world will
know who is who based on the acts of the actor. That is, if the robot behaves
like a human and acts appropriately then the world will be deceived and will
accept it as a human. In this case, the program is forced to play a game of
imitation. Such a game was proposed by Turing as a test for Intelligence.
It is to be concluded that if a program meets the definition in [1], then it
is satisfactory to the Turing test – maybe not immediately but after it has
taken some time for training.
Question: Is it possible that the world recognizes the robot (while it is
still on training and has not started to act like a man) and starts scoring
low from that first moment of recognition till infinity? The answer is: No,
because only worlds without fatal errors are considered and this world does
not meet this requirement.
Does that mean that the definition in [1] is equivalent to the Turing test?
Not, if we train the program in [1] to pretend being a human, then it will
satisfy the Turing test but only after training. Is it possible that the program
satisfying the Turing test be trained to do well in an arbitrary world? The
answer is: most likely not. If the program can pretend to be human, then it
can be trained for any world. However, it should rather pretend to be stupid
and hide its intelligence or otherwise it will betray the fact that it is a robot
and not a human. If it is forbidden for the examiner to punish excessive
intelligence, then the definition in [1] and the Turing test will be equivalent.
Impossible World
Is it possible that a world is so complex that there is no program that could
understand it? Yes, it is. For example, let the world generate an infinite row
of zeros and ones. The Artificial Intelligence program has been given a task
to make a guess what comes next (zero or one). Let the function describing
this infinite row is not computable. Then, there is no way for the program
to calculate and say with confidence which number will follow. This is true
about the human, as well. Nevertheless, the program and the human will
find different dependencies. One could be that the zeros are more than the
ones, or another – that one is more likely to come after a zero, etc.
It is not necessary that the Artificial Intelligence should understand the
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world at 100 %. What is important is to understand the world better than
the human.
IQ (Intelligence Quotient)
The first definition compares the intelligence of the program with that of a
human. The second definition cannot make this comparison, because we want
the definition to be formal. Because of that, it is necessary to introduce an
independent assessment of IQ by which we could define Artificial Intelligence.
We will say that we acknowledge as AI those programs whose IQ is above
certain value. This value was taken to be 0.7 in [2] but this choice has
been largely arbitrary. It is rather correct to say that certain IQ exists and
the programs more intelligent than this level are acknowledged as Artificial
Intelligence.
We introduce the function Success which returns a number in the interval
[0, 1] for each particular life. This number makes assessment of the program’s
success in the particular life. Afterwards, the IQ is calculated selecting a set
of test worlds, running the program to live a life in each one of these worlds
and calculating the average success of the program in all its test lives.
Thus, the IQ is the average value of Success function calculated based on
the set of test worlds.
World Complexity
Another substantial difference between both definitions is that the first con-
siders all possible worlds; whereas the second limits the sets of the worlds
to a finite number of test worlds (the assumption is that the test world is
computable with fixed level of complexity). This fixed level of complexity is
the second parameter in the definition.
How did we select the set of test worlds?
Something similar has been done in paper [1]. There it was proposed that
we prepare a test consisting of finite or countable number of test worlds. The
idea is to acknowledge as Artificial Intelligence the program that can manage
in all these worlds. Paper [1] has proposed that these worlds be prepared by
a human but we want to be as formal as possible in paper [2] and therefore
we will define the set of test worlds in a way that does not rely on human
actions. The other difference is that in [1] we want the program to pass all
exams, i.e. to manage in all test worlds, whereas in [2] we want the average
success (i.e. IQ) to be greater than 0.7. Why we want to have less in [2]
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than in [1]? Because, if the problems are prepared by hand we would want
the program to solve them all, but if the problems are randomly generated
then some of them will be insolvable and therefore we cannot require from
the program to solve all problems.
What is the set of test worlds that we could use for the calculation of the
IQ of an arbitrary program?
The first natural possibility is to take the set of all worlds. This set is
infinite, even uncountable and seems too large (it is not clear what should be
the weight of different worlds in the set). The first thing we see is that many
of the worlds are indistinguishable (i.e. their tree of the world is the same).
That’s why we resort to the next idea: to take the quotient set, i.e. the set
of all possible trees of the world, and make it our set of test worlds. This set
is again uncountable, but considering the fact that we limited the lifespan,
we see that the set of these trees is even finite (more precisely, the set of
the trees of determined worlds is finite. It is finite with the undetermined
worlds, as well, because the branches are equally probable to happen – see
the definition of TM W in [2]).
This set is not suitable (although it is finite) because in such a case any-
thing is possible! How would the world evolve for the next step? In fact, it
could evolve in any way. Anything is possible, indeed, but far from anything
is probable. If we accept this set as the test one, then any continuation will
be equally probable and the past will be of no significance. This totally con-
tradicts our idea of Artificial Intelligence which says that the device gathers
experience and undergoes training. Thus, what has happened in the past is
important.
This is the point to apply the principle known as ‘Occam’s razor’ stating
that the simpler model is more probable than the complex one. Therefore,
the simpler world is more probable than the complex one. If we are to discuss
the complexity of a world, then we would introduce a description of the world
and define the complexity of the world as the length of the shortest possible
description.
We have used Turing machines to describe the worlds in [2]. This is not
the most suitable model in case you try to make a real program which satisfies
the definition. However, here it works as a theoretical model of computability.
Still, we do not want to be limited within the set of the determined worlds
and this is why we have introduced undetermined Turing machines. Thus,
our test worlds are the computable worlds generated by the undetermined
Turing machines.
We suggest next the set of test worlds to be taken as the set of the
undetermined Turing machines, inclusive of all such machines regardless of
their size. Could we choose a particular size and do only with the machines
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of that size? The answer is: rather yes.
If we take all Turing machines we should give them different weights since
there is no way that an infinite number of machines are of equal weight and
the sum of their weights equals one. Having decided what will be the weights
of the different machines, there are two options to go for: either the average
size (length) of the machines is a particular number, or the average size is
infinity (depending on the weights we have finally chosen). If the average
size is finite, then we can assume that instead of using all Turing machines
as test ones, we would use only those whose size is the average. This is not
the same but is almost the same. If the average size is infinity, then there
exist an N such that all machines with greater size would have almost no
influence on the average. Therefore, is we chose an ε that seems to us small
enough to be ignored, then such N exists that the machines longer than N
will influence less than ε of the average success. Then we can decide that
N is the size of the test machines and the result will be similar to what we
would have if we consider all machines with their respective weights.
Next question: If we have decided on a particular N , should our test
machines be these of size smaller or equal to N or those with the size of N
exactly. The answer is: there is no need to include the shorter machines,
because each machine with size N − 1 has many equivalent machines with
size N (because we can add a state that is not necessary).
So far, so good. We have decided that the test worlds will be the com-
putable worlds that are computed by an undetermined Turing machine hav-
ing the size of N . This is the next parameter that our definition depends on.
In [2], we decided on a particular value of 20 for this parameter. We choose
that all test machines will participate with equal weights (this is possible
because the set is finite).
Does the set chosen in this way correspond to the principle of Occam?
Are the simpler worlds more probable than the complex ones? The answer
is yes. Indeed, all machines participate with equal weights but the simple
machines come with a large number of equivalent machines (which compute
the same world), whereas there is not a single equivalent machine for the
most complex ones (certainly, not of the same complexity, in this case with
complexity value of 20). This is to say that the simpler the world is, the more
machines with size 20 happen to compute it and the more this world would
influence the average value of Success function. We refer to this average value
as IQ.
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Which is the suitable model?
We have already said that Turing machines are not the suitable model to
describe the world. We would like to have simple dependences in the world
that are on the surface and easy to be discovered; whereas the deeper we
go, the more and more complex dependences become. The Turing machine
is a dependence that may appear to be rather complex but once you have
understood it, you have understood the world. The case of the undetermined
machines is more suitable because the randomness is an infinitely complex
dependence. Therefore, we will never understand this dependence because
once we understand it, it will become pseudorandomness (take the example
of pseudorandom numbers generated by a computer).
Is it possible that a complex Turing machine is partially described by
means of simpler dependences? This is possible but it is not typical for the
Turing machine model. In this model usually, you either understand the
whole world or you don’t understand anything.
If we are looking for a world model of the type of determined machine,
then very soon (i.e. after very short life experience) it would turn out that the
first Turing machine corresponding to that life experience is so complex that
it is virtually impossible to be found. The advantage of the undetermined
machines is that we will always be able to find such world model (no matter
how long is the life experience). It is a different question how adequate is this
model and how good it will work for us, because the undetermined machine
does not say what will happen on the next step, but it rather says that this
or that can happen. In the best case, it provides the probability of having
this or that happening.
Well, which is the suitable model of the world? We should think of
the world as a union of different factors that may be connected but are
largely independent. Certainly, we will need a better model if we want to
create a particular program satisfying the definition of Artificial Intelligence.
However, this is not important for the definition itself.
Work of other researchers
The occasion to write this paper is publication [5] where two swiss scientists
attempt to generalize the definitions in [1, 2]. Their idea is to get rid of
the parameters, which the definition in [2] depends on and to get to a new
concept of IQ independent of any parameters.
They remove the restriction on lifespan and assume that life is infinite. In
their discussion the initial part of the life trajectory is the most significant.
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They assume that the rewards become lighter at each next step, having been
multiplied by a discount coefficient
Surely, the coefficient of discount is also a parameter, and they have
simply replaced one parameter with another. What is more, their choice
contradicts the idea that the beginning of life is not important. What is im-
portant is what happens after the program has been already trained. Their
presentation assumes the beginning of life as the most important part. After
some time the life trajectory has suffered so much discounting that in prac-
tice, it is not important what the program is doing anymore. Certainly, in
[2] there is a moment (the maximum length of life) after which it is not any-
more important what the program is doing, but at least until that moment
all rewards are of equal importance. This is to say, in our case ‘it runs, it
runs and stops’, whereas in theirs ‘it fades, it fades, it fades and like this to
infinity’.
We have to acknowledge that the authors of [5] have understood that
the coefficient of discount is a parameter which their definition depends on
and have, therefore, proposed a second version. It would have been better
if the second version have not been proposed, at all, as it has resulted in
meaningless outcome compromising the whole paper. More, about the second
version, has been written further below (see Striking mistakes 3 and 4).
The other parameter that the authors of [5] have tried to get rid of is
the world complexity (the number of states of the Turing machine which
generates the world). We have decided on a particular complexity. They have
preferred to sum up all complexities having used a coefficient of discount 1/2.
This results in having average complexity of 2 in their case (this parameter
has been picked to be 20 in our case). This is to say, that if they want to allow
higher values of average complexity, they will have to replace the number
1/2 with a different parameter. Therefore, they replace one parameter with
another, again.
They get rid of the parameter 0.7 by avoiding to say what Artificial
Intelligence is. They define IQ but they do not say how big the quotient
should be in order for a program to be acknowledged as Artificial Intelligence.
Unfortunately, our Swiss colleagues have failed to quote the Bulgarian
primary source. Another problem is the fact that they have not managed
to understand many details of the original papers and, therefore, there are
many mistakes and inaccuracies in the resultant text.
Striking mistakes
Here are six of the most striking mistakes made in [5].
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1. The authors state that the world is computable according to the thesis
of Church. Indeed, [1] states that it follows from the thesis of Church that the
Artificial Intelligence is a program but not that the world is a program, too.
Is the world computable or not, is it determined or not – these are questions
whose answers we do not know and will never know. This is something that
cannot be verified because there is no experiment that can result in an answer
to any of these questions. (The question whether the world is determined
has been considered in details in [3]. The question whether the world is
computable is analogous).
2. The authors have defined IQ in such a way that it is infinity for each
program. They have not considered the fact that the number of programs
grows exponentially with the increase of their length. This can be regarded
as a mistake by oversight, moreover that it is clear how it can be fixed. (In
their case they sum up the programs’ success achieved in different lives, i.e.
the values of function Success. This sum does not require that each addend
is multiplied by 1/2 raised to the power of the complexity degree. Rather,
one should take the average for the respective complexity and multiply it by
the same discount). We said above that the average complexity of the world
is 2, having assumed that this mistake is fixed. If [5] remains unchanged,
then the average complexity is infinity and the sum that we refer to as IQ
is infinity, too. Thus, if this mistake is not fixed, the IQ concept becomes
meaningless.
3. The most serious problem in [5] is the second version of definition that
was proposed in order to avoid the coefficient of discount. The set of worlds
differs in this version and respectively the Success function differs too (the
Success function returns assessment of the success that has been achieved in
each life trajectory).
Let’s summaries the outcome in [1], [2] and both versions in [5].
In [1] is considered an infinite life in a set of worlds without fatal errors.
In [2] is assumed that life is finite. The first version proposed in [5] describes
life as infinite but fading which is the same, as if the life is finite. The second
version proposed in [5] assumes infinite life in a world where all errors are
fatal. The problem in this case is not that there could be a fatal error (fatal
errors do not interfere in [2] and will not interfere in this case, as well). The
problem is that all errors are fatal. This is to say, that there are no fixable
errors. Humans do not learn from their fatal errors. Perhaps, they have
learned from the fatal errors of others but not from their own. That’s why
this concept contradicts the idea of learning.
The Success function is monotonically increasing in the second version
proposed in [5]. It was defined to be the sum of all rewards which are numbers
in the interval [0, 1]. It is natural to consider that the Success function can
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be increasing and decreasing during a lifetime. Life steps at which it starts
to decrease can be considered as a fixable mistakes. The authors of [5] have
preferred to have this function monotonically increasing which means that
the device cannot make fixable errors. The only possible mistake is of the
type ‘lost profits’ and this mistake is always fatal because once the profits
are lost there is no way to bring them back. Besides, there is no feedback
in the ‘lost profits’ case. When the Success function changes, the program
will know that, but there is no way to know when it is missing on profits.
Eventually, it might get to know that in the future, but since life is infinite
there is really no way for the device to know – it will always hope that the
profits are not lost and will soon materialise.
4. The decision of the authors of [5] to limit the sum of the rewards is
rather strange and illogical. It reminds me of one maths professor during my
undergraduate years. All of us students at the time believed that he had a
limit on the A grades. We thought that one should be among the first to
be examined because he will run out of A grades and no matter how much
knowledge you demonstrate, if you are among the last to be examined, you
will not get an A.
This limitation is imposed, in their case, so that the Success function will
be in the interval [0, 1]. Instead of distorting the world in such a horrible
way, it would be better if the Success function is the arithmetical mean of
the rewards (as it was done in [2]) instead of being the sum of the rewards.
This would place the Success function in the interval [0, 1], and it would lift
the requirement to be monotonically increasing.
The conclusion is that in their second version of the IQ definition the
authors of [5] use worlds where training is impossible. The success of the
device in such a world depends solely on its luck, however if the worlds are
sufficiently many, luck ceases to have an effect. Thus, all programs will be
equally intelligent.
The question to ask is whether the authors of [5] have managed to under-
stand that both [1] and [2] consider a device that is being trained and will
achieve good success as a result of the training, or they rather believe that it
is born trained. As a matter of fact, the beginning of [5] says that the device
should be given sufficient time for training, however, later they propose two
versions of the definition which contradict this idea (especially the second
version).
It is true that with the definition of Turing, there is a device that was
born trained, but this concerns a particular world. The device can be born
trained for a particular world but there is no way that it was born trained
for every world.
5. We can consider as a mistake the fact that the definition of a world in
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[5] has been altered. The world in [1] has got a set of internal states and a
function indicating how to transfer from one state to another. As you know,
there is a tree of the world corresponding to each world. It was the tree of
the world that has been regarded for the definition of the world in [5]. This is
the same as if we do not consider functions in mathematics but only graphs
of functions. We can somewhat justify the authors of [5] because they make
their attempt to improve somehow the definition of AI, however their change
implies that they have not understood our main idea. We suppose that the
world has got some structure and the device attempts to understand that
structure. They deny the structure of the world and this is a mistake.
They make a similar mistake when they define the device, as well. The
device is a program for us, whereas for them it is a strategy. Certainly, there
is a strategy corresponding to each program (but not vice versa). Still, to
consider the device as a strategy is a mistake, as thus we presume that it
has not got internal states, i.e. no memory. This mistake is very common
among researchers working in the area of AI. Many of them look for the AI
in the set of the functions, meaning that for them AI is a device without
memory. The strategy is also a function, whose input argument is the entire
life experience (life history). At first sight, it looks as if we do not need a
memory as if we have as input the entire life experience, but this is not true.
Imagine that at some point (based of your whole life experience) you
decide to go to the fridge and grab a beer. Ten seconds later, you see that
you are on your way to the fridge but you do not know if you are going to
get a beer or milk. It is true that you can rely on your whole life experience
but this will not answer the question. If you were told to fetch a beer, this
can be extracted from your life experience, but if you have, yourself, decided
to grab a beer, you would not remember it (because you have no memory)
and there is no way that you extract it out of the life experience. This is to
say, the memory is needed. We have to note that it is absurd that the device
will make a decision at any step based on its whole life experience (because
this is a huge amount of information). It is more reasonable to assume that
it decides based on its internal state and the immediate input received in the
last step.
6. The last comment to make with reference to [5] is the strange argument
about the question whether the rewarding is to be part of the world or part of
the device. The rewarding has been confidently treated as part of the world
at the beginning of [5] and the dilemma about its belonging at the end of
the paper is rather odd. The authors answer this question themselves saying
that if the students are allowed to mark their knowledge themselves they will
all have excellent results.
Nevertheless, the confusion of Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter about the
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belonging of the rewards is reasonable. They consider the human being
and ask themselves aren’t the rewards in that case the feelings of pain and
pleasure (with food, sex, music and other sources of pleasure). The answer
we would give is that the human has not built-in rewards. Success with
regards to the human being is evaluated by the world through the process
of evolution. Evolution defines success in our world for those who manage
to survive in it and to reproduce. A human does not receive his or her
rewards system readily. Actually, humans never receive it. If one has lived in
compliance with the evolution’s principles, about which he is not aware, then
he will survive long enough to be inherited in the next generation. This is
the reason why people are looking for the meaning of life all their lives (they
are looking for it, because they do not know it). As long as the feeling of pain
and pleasure are concerned, this is not the meaning of life but an instinct.
Thus, humans are born with some knowledge. They instinctively know that
pain is bad, whereas pleasure is good. These instincts should not be trusted
blindly. For example, the feeling of pain when the dentist pulls a tooth is a
misleading signal (as far as the dentist pulls the right tooth, of course). The
bitter taste in food is instinctively perceived as bad but with time people get
to like the taste of coffee and of beer, for example. The feeling of pleasure is
also often a misleading signal.
Despite all the remarks we have made, the papers of Shane Legg and
Marcus Hutter are very valuable to us, because they are the first to acknowl-
edge the definitions in [1, 2]. Furthermore, the analysis of the mistakes made
by our Swiss colleagues is also useful because it indicates what has not been
explained sufficiently well. It is obvious that Shane Legg and Marcus Hut-
ter have done serious work on this subject and it was useful for us to study
their attempt to improve our definition. Where they have not understood
the definitions of [1, 2], this is our fault, as we seem to have poorly explained
them before. The present paper was prepared on the basis of this analysis
and we hope that it will be helpful for all researchers working in the field of
Artificial Intelligence.
Getting rid of the parameters
Could we, after all, get rid of the parameters in definition [2]? We could get
rid of the parameters taking part in the definition of IQ, but I cannot think
of a way to get rid of the coefficient that tells us which is the minimum IQ
sufficient enough to acknowledge the program as AI.
To remove the parameters in the definition of IQ, let’s look at the IQ as a
function of the lifespan and the world’s complexity. We could take the limit
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of that function in the case when these two variables approach infinity, and
take this limit to be the new, parameter-free, IQ.
Note: Actually, [2] mentions yet another parameter. This is the maxi-
mum number of small steps that the Turing machine of the respective world
is allowed to make in a single big step. We could assume that the complexity
of the world depends on two parameters – the number of states of the Turing
machine and the maximum number of small steps for a big one. That means
that the IQ definition depends on three rather than on two parameters.
If we define IQ through a limit to infinity, the question is whether such
limit of this function actually exists. Our first concern is whether that limit
would not turn out to be infinity. Let me remind you that the Success
function was calculated as the arithmetical mean of the rewards gained for
the victory, loss or draw, which are respectively 1, 0 and 1/2. This means
that the function is in the [0, 1] interval. It follows that IQ is also in the [0,
1] interval because this is the mean value of the Success function. Therefore,
the limit of IQ in the case when its arguments approach infinity is also in the
[0, 1] interval.
Our second concern is whether that function would not turn out to be
divergent, i.e. its lower limit to turn out to be strictly smaller that the upper
one. Is it possible for a world to exist in which success jumps up and down
again and again in the course of life and never converges to any specific value?
Imagine a world in which with the first step you gain victory, with the next
two steps – loss, with the next 4 steps victory again, and with the next 8 –
loss again.
Worlds like these are, of course, very few and cannot affect the IQ value,
but is it possible for a program to exist, whose IQ jumps up and down again
and again depending on the lifespan? Imagine a program which is quite
clever and knows what’s going on, but nonetheless now plays to win and now
plays to lose. We will again use the sequence of intervals 2n and will assume
that in each following interval the program changes its behavior.
Is it possible for a program to have a good IQ when the complexity of
the world is low, but to show a rapid drop in its IQ when the complexity
of the world increases? Yes, this is the so-called ‘cramming’ program. This
program does well in a small number of worlds, provided it has been designed
specifically for the worlds in question. However, when the worlds grow in
number and in complexity, the ‘cramming’ program fails.
Therefore, it is possible that the IQ function is not convergent. In this
case the new IQ would be chosen as the arithmetical mean of the IQ function’s
lower and upper limit.
If we accept this new definition of IQ, we will loose the best feature of this
function – the fact that it is computable. Nonetheless, we do not compute
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the exact value of this function due to the combinatorial explosion caused by
the large number of possible worlds and possible life trajectories. Instead,
we calculate its approximate value by using the statistical method: picking
randomly a small part of all test worlds. This is our statistical sample within
which we let the program live one test life in each world.
We can approximately calculate the new IQ function as well, by taking
at random one countable sample of worlds and putting them in line. We will
want that the sequence of test worlds to show growing complexity. We will
let the program live one test life in each sample world, making lives longer
at each run. For every test live we will calculate the Success function. If we
take the average Success from the first N lives then we will have a sequence
of interim results, which will converge to the limit of IQ (i.e. the new IQ, if
the old IQ has a limit). If the function IQ has no limit, then the sequence
will not be convergent but its upper and lower limits will coincide with the
lower and upper limit of IQ.
Of course, we cannot calculate the limit of this sequence. We have to put
up with approximating calculation. We can choose an N which is big enough
and suppose that the limit of the sequence is approximately equal to its N-th
element. In fact, this is the same as if we pick a big enough complexity of
the world and big enough lifespan and calculate for them the value of IQ of
the program.
The question is whether to define the new IQ as the limit of IQ in the
case when the complexity of the world and the lifespan approach infinity, or
whether it is better to assume that we’ve selected big enough values for those
parameters, and to take this as our new IQ. [2] adopts the second solution.
Concerning the coefficient that determines the minimum IQ sufficient
enough to acknowledge the program as AI, this value must be somewhere
between 1/2 (the intelligence of the most stupid program) and the intelli-
gence of the smartest one, i.e. the intelligence of Trivial Decision 5. It is
advisable to take the IQ of a human being, since for us a program with a suf-
ficient intelligence is the program smarter than a human being. The problem
is that we do not know the value of human IQ. We could try calculating its
approximate value by making tests with human beings. I have some experi-
ence experimenting with my students, and the result is that students cannot
manage even with a simple world such as the Tic-Tac-Toe game. It is true
that with this case there was some over-coding, which made the world too
complex and prevented the students from understanding it. It is also true
that training is supposed to continue your entire life, while my students tried
to understand this world in only 45 minutes. I assume that if the students
have passed training in solving problems of the kind, they would show much
better results. However, the results from my experiment with students can-
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not be accepted as reliable and that, in general, human IQ is difficult to
measure following experimental methods.
Of course, measuring human IQ is completely useless. What is impor-
tant for us is to know what AI is, and these are the programs of sufficient
intelligence. The more intelligent a program is, the better.
Who is more perfect?
The definition of IQ creates an order: who is more intelligent and who – more
stupid. When we change the definition of IQ, we in effect alter the order that
this definition gives. Thus a program could be “smarter” than another under
one definition of IQ, and not so under the other definition. If we choose the
IQ to be the limit in the case when the lifespan and the complexity of the
world approach infinity, then we would prioritise for the programs learning
at a slower rate rather than the programs learning at a faster rate.
One of my father’s classmates [7] had a theory that the slower one creature
develops, the more perfect it is. He gave examples with animals and humans,
claiming that humans are more perfect than animals. Yet another of his
arguments was that most renowned people did not show much brightness
when they were children. He also compared man and women, saying that
girls develop faster than boys but men achieve better results in the field of
abstract thinking.
I agree with his observations, but I cannot agree with his conclusions.
First of all, I do not agree that humans are more perfect than animals. If
we compare the physical strength, fastness, endurance to cold, famine and
pain, we will see that humans significantly lack in those qualities compared
to animals. We humans are also inferior to animals in regards to beauty. It is
true that we like women, but that’s because we are instinctively programmed
to like them, and not due to some objective reasons. Women do not have
colorful feathers or something else that would impress an animal of another
species. Take for example the udder of the cow – for the bull it would
probably be a source of inspiration for a poem, but for us humans it has no
beauty at all.
This article is dedicated to the intellect and therefore we are to compare
humans and animals in terms of their intellect, not taking into account their
other features. Can we claim that humans are cleverer than animals? Com-
paring two brains is like comparing two cars. If one is faster and the other
more powerful, which one is the better? The brain has so many character-
istics that it is difficult to decide which brain is better. For example, the
long-term memory of elephants is much better than that of humans. Exper-
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iments show that some monkeys have much better short-term memory than
humans. If we assume that the most important characteristic of the brain
is the ability of abstract thinking, then it might turn out that octopuses are
much more capable than us humans. Of course, octopuses are very stupid
animals but this is because abstract thinking is not all. Octopuses have no
relations between generations and they are self-taught. To compare a hu-
man being with an octopus, a human must have grown without parents and
educators.
Shortly, I do not agree that people are more perfect than animals. I don’t
agree either that abstract thinking, which is better developed with men, is
more important than intuitive thinking – more developed with women. It
is true that with abstract thinking, when we have a solution, we know how
we’ve come to that solution, while intuitive thinking gives us a solution but
we do not know how we’ve reached that solution. That’s why, often when we
talk about reasoning, we mean abstract thinking, but there are areas where
intuitive thinking gives a much better result than abstract one. In areas like
these women are much more successful than men.
As far as the so-called renowned people are concerned, I also cannot agree
that they are more perfect than the rest of us. It is no coincidence that most
geniuses have not been recognized during their lifetime. Can you imagine
how many geniuses there are who are not recognized even after their death?
Geniuses that all their life have been considered idiots and are long forgotten.
It follows that it is not a good idea to change the definition of IQ and take
the program that is most suitable for the case when the lifespan approaches
infinity. Thus, the retarded program will become one of the cleverest ones,
and as we’ve already mentioned, this program does not satisfy our idea of
Artificial Intelligence. It’s better to stick to IQ defined as the most suitable
program for the specific lifespan.
Different tasks take different tools. Our idea of finding a universal tool
that is good for any task is praiseworthy but very often – difficult to attain.
Very often one quality is at the expense of another. With a real brain, when
one part is better developed, this is at the expense of the rest (and that’s
because the real brain must fit into the real skull). When we give a description
of the artificial brain, we can assume that we have no physical limitations
and that all parts could be developed to a maximum extent; however, the
training time is a limited resource with both the real and the artificial brain.
“Time” in regards to the artificial brain means the number of steps, while
for the real it means seconds, hours and years. Let’s assume that the real
brain makes 24 steps per second (as with the frames in cinema); thus, the
idea of time with the real and the artificial brain will be one and the same.
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